# Credit assessment of the five largest U.S. banks

**As of 26 October 2026 UTC — using Watchtower MCP only**

**My overall assessment:** JPMorgan has the strongest combination of reported profitability and available market credit pricing in this group. **Citigroup and Goldman Sachs deserve the most additional scrutiny**, for different reasons. Bank of America and Wells Fargo show solid reported balance-sheet buffers, with earnings sensitivity and loan performance the main areas to monitor.

Importantly, **all five have investment-grade references from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch in the retrieved data.** Fitch’s positive outlooks for Citibank and Goldman Sachs Bank USA are constructive counterevidence to an overly pessimistic interpretation.

I define “top five” using Watchtower’s **June 30, 2026 FDIC bank-level asset table**: JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo Bank, and Goldman Sachs Bank USA. These are the insured banking entities, distinct from their publicly traded parent companies.

## 1. What the credit-rating evidence says

These are **long-term issuer ratings**, except Fitch’s column, which is its **foreign-currency Long-Term Issuer Default Rating**. Dates are the reported **agency action dates**, not the date Watchtower retrieved the record.

| Banking entity | Moody’s issuer rating | S&P issuer credit rating | Fitch issuer default rating |
|---|---|---|---|
| **JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.** | [Aa2](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=dba50b122486c338a5e13987a5103d75c5b2860875d30e87a1bdce4cc7ad61ed) — 6 Jul 2026 | [AA−](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=10540ddd9923a3c82d59574f89664e935b7cdd054d52ce9c22aa9f2a1120bb01) — 15 Nov 2024 | [AA](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=728e74281c60efee43910e3495871aed33639ae0b32db9954aa774a0151a39e3) — 22 May 2026 |
| **Bank of America, N.A.** | [Aa2](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=02b307a213290f7c949e6d6c1afe971f022bba44fffcc719b2c6aaae2963f64c) — 16 Oct 2026 | [A+](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=83cbea50a2b458958254d7f8616723a361615e892d5d9018028ba736c30a0dd5) — 13 May 2026 | [AA](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=8f7a29490f64367bbd632303ea5fe49fd5dc2a2ef55c94b059fac0e4bc322c2c) — 21 May 2026 |
| **Citibank, N.A.** | [Aa3](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=5e68f9f14fe03679aead12596579ec5d77d871aba2a1f5a54520e9618e17ab0f) — 17 Nov 2025 | [A+](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=ecb3540397b6d5cfc1a975e2af540a6f470475a6bcec9031df622ad0a898b1f4) — 6 Nov 2025 | [AA−, positive outlook](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=6cff2e8e133b8a8ee28bdf9eb277788258ff49f99c34a22961560e3fd2ea51e4) — 2 Jun 2026 |
| **Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.** | [Aa2](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=9e5b63dc11cbcc676f897ea7849336db88f62954741a5488ab0b8b942600ef35) — 5 Oct 2026 | [A+](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=34a332576d3d204377c96b6bbda0418d0c27eddede51c69e1f1accf1406e13a7) — 29 Sep 2026 | [AA−](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=7d1c0cd53dd8b1e1e38a3569c0786b83098e4476199290dc7df94a16a6d74250) — 6 May 2026 |
| **Goldman Sachs Bank USA** | [A1](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=f22ec601909b1210a503c7b544e38d7c7bca257681416fafb0188cc4368523e1) — 17 Nov 2025 | [A+](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=3bfd4aa9f5c6cfb2012d0cd69594b4d120aad31325119ea05f6f4ef3af7d7df1) — 29 Apr 2026 | [AA−, positive outlook](https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/details?core=esma_registers_radar&docId=635dfbb26a28c187be01ed1c40a56bfce87e5ec27de03210e4343b8797589c26) — 12 May 2026 |

All other outlooks shown above are **stable**. Goldman’s cited Fitch action was an **upgrade**; Citi’s was an affirmation.

**Important qualification:** Watchtower labels these ESMA reporting-agency records as **not independently certified current**. An older action date does not automatically make a rating invalid, but a fresh retrieval does not prove that no subsequent change occurred. Deposit ratings, counterparty ratings and individual bond ratings can also differ from these issuer ratings.

## 2. Comparable financial position

The following figures are for the **bank subsidiaries**, using the same **June 30, 2026 reporting date**.

| Bank | Assets, USD trillions | Book equity/assets | Reported ROA | Net loans/deposits |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| JPMorgan Chase Bank | **4.091** | 8.35% | **1.59%** | 54.45% |
| Bank of America | **2.655** | **9.07%** | 1.13% | 56.48% |
| Citibank | **1.976** | 8.71% | **1.06%** | 47.78% |
| Wells Fargo Bank | **1.908** | 8.89% | 1.38% | **62.93%** |
| Goldman Sachs Bank USA | **0.759** | **7.94%** | 1.21% | 49.64% |

Source: Watchtower’s `bankrun-tracker`, drawing on [FDIC quarterly financial reporting](https://banks.data.fdic.gov/bankfind-suite/financialreporting).

These measures require careful interpretation:

- **Book equity/assets is not CET1 or a regulatory leverage ratio.** Different asset risk weights and business models matter.
- **Net loans/deposits is not a liquidity coverage ratio.** It does not measure immediately available cash or collateral.
- Watchtower’s reported uninsured/total-deposit ratios range from approximately **42% to 50%**, but some insured/uninsured components do not reconcile cleanly to total deposits. I would use those estimates directionally, rather than calculate precise withdrawal vulnerability from them.

## 3. Where each bank’s risks are

### JPMorgan — strongest observed combination, with substantial absolute exposure

**Supporting evidence**
- Highest reported ROA in the group: **1.59%**.
- Strong issuer-rating references across all three agencies.
- Lowest available parent-company CDS reference among the three covered names: **49.38 basis points**.

**Main risks to monitor**
- Whether rising credit costs begin to erode its comparatively strong earnings buffer.
- Funding resilience across a reported **$2.82 trillion deposit base**.
- Concentrations and counterparty exposures that are not visible in the summary balance-sheet data.

Its **8.35% book equity/assets** ratio is below Bank of America, Citi and Wells Fargo, so strong earnings should not be confused with having the largest unweighted capital cushion.

**Assessment:** The strongest relative benchmark in the available evidence. The key question is whether profitability continues to absorb credit deterioration, rather than whether size alone makes it safe.

### Bank of America — strongest book-equity ratio, but a thinner earnings cushion than JPMorgan

**Supporting evidence**
- Highest book equity/assets ratio in the group: **9.07%**.
- Moody’s **Aa2** affirmation dated **October 16, 2026**, alongside stable S&P and Fitch references.
- Net loans/deposits of **56.48%** does not suggest an unusually loan-heavy deposit-funding structure within this sample.

**Main risks to monitor**
- Earnings compression: its **1.13% ROA** trails JPMorgan and Wells Fargo.
- Interest-rate repricing, deposit costs and securities valuation.
- Whether credit losses consume a greater share of earnings.

However, Watchtower did **not provide a sufficiently current bank-specific HTM/AOCI breakdown or net-interest-income sensitivity analysis** in the retrieved feeds. I therefore cannot quantify its present unrealized securities losses or simply repeat older loss headlines as current facts.

**Assessment:** Solid reported balance-sheet support; earnings and rate sensitivity are the principal diligence priorities. The available CDS reference table does not cover Bank of America.

### Citigroup/Citibank — earnings resilience and data freshness warrant closer scrutiny

**Supporting evidence**
- Citibank’s **8.71% book equity/assets** and **47.78% net loans/deposits** provide useful structural offsets.
- Fitch reports **AA− with a positive outlook**, affirmed in June 2026.

**Main risks to monitor**
- Lowest reported ROA in this five-bank sample: **1.06%**.
- Citigroup’s parent-company CDS reference is **68.69 bp**, versus JPMorgan’s **49.38 bp**.
- The parent-company SEC dossier is materially less current: its selected financial period ends **December 31, 2025**, and Watchtower explicitly flags those metrics as stale.

That last point is an **information gap**, not evidence that Citi has deteriorated. The June 2026 Citibank figures cannot substitute for a current consolidated Citigroup capital and liquidity assessment.

**Assessment:** A higher-priority monitoring name because of comparatively weaker profitability, higher parent credit pricing and less current consolidated evidence. **Fitch’s positive outlook is important counterevidence** to a blanket negative conclusion.

### Wells Fargo — loan performance is the clearest monitoring channel

**Supporting evidence**
- Reported ROA of **1.38%**, second highest in this sample.
- Book equity/assets of **8.89%**.
- Recent stable rating references: S&P in September and Moody’s in October 2026.

**Main risks to monitor**
- Highest net loans/deposits ratio of the five: **62.93%**. That makes loan performance and deposit retention particularly relevant to this comparison.
- The direction of charge-offs, nonperforming loans and reserve coverage.
- Current regulatory requirements and remediation costs, if supported by dated evidence.

A 62.93% ratio is **not, by itself, evidence of excessive funding strain**. Nor did the retrieved data establish that Wells currently has the worst commercial-real-estate portfolio. Bank-specific CRE exposure and loss data are missing.

**Assessment:** Reasonable observed financial strength, with asset quality the first area to investigate. I would not treat historical regulatory headlines as proof of a current restriction.

### Goldman Sachs — book leverage and market credit pricing merit attention

**Supporting evidence**
- Goldman Sachs Bank USA remains investment grade in the retrieved references.
- Fitch’s **May 2026 upgrade to AA− with a positive outlook** is constructive.

**Main risks to monitor**
- Lowest bank-level book equity/assets ratio in the group: **7.94%**.
- Moody’s bank issuer reference of **A1**, below the other four banks on Moody’s scale.
- Parent-company CDS reference of **68.96 bp**, close to Citi’s and above JPMorgan’s.

The first follow-up areas would be **market repricing, counterparty exposure, collateral requirements and the quality of the capital buffer**. The retrieved summaries do not provide enough detail to quantify those positions or establish current losses.

**Assessment:** Greater sensitivity deserves investigation, but the evidence is mixed rather than uniformly negative. Its lower unweighted equity ratio does not establish that it has the weakest regulatory capital position.

## 4. What current market conditions add

### Parent-company CDS references

Watchtower’s public five-year CDS table reports the following for **October 23, 2026**:

| Reference entity | Published spread |
|---|---:|
| JPMorgan Chase & Co. | **49.38 bp** |
| Citigroup Inc. | **68.69 bp** |
| Goldman Sachs Group Inc. | **68.96 bp** |

Source: [BSW published CDS references, CMA/ICE](https://www.derbsw.de/en/credit-default-swaps/), retrieved through Watchtower.

These are **holding-company references**, not quotes for the bank subsidiaries above. Currency, seniority, restructuring clause and bid/ask convention are not supplied. The comparison is therefore indicative; the **0.27 bp difference between Citi and Goldman is not a meaningful basis for ranking their safety**.

### Credit conditions are more concerning than the latest aggregate funding spreads

The retrieved Watchtower feeds show:

- **High-yield option-adjusted spread: 3.40%**, approximately **67 bp wider over one month**.
- **Senior-loan ETF price basket: −1.24% over one month**.
- **BDC price basket: −4.88% over one month**.

These indicate pressure in lower-quality credit and listed lending vehicles. They are **market-price signals, not measured losses or fund outflows at the five banks**. Sources: Watchtower’s [credit/derivatives monitor](https://www.watchtower.technology/agent/api/credit-derivatives-risk) and [hidden-credit monitor](https://www.watchtower.technology/agent/api/hidden-credit-stress).

Conversely, the latest reported funding observations are relatively calm:

- **SOFR–IORB spread: 0 bp**, October 22.
- **Financial commercial paper–Treasury bill spread: 4 bp**, October 20.
- **Aggregate commercial-bank deposits: +1.75% over 13 weeks**, through October 14.

These are system-wide observations. Watchtower explicitly lacks **direct institution-level withdrawal feeds and repo counterparty allocations**, so they cannot establish any individual bank’s liquidity position.

## 5. What limits the conclusion

The most consequential missing inputs are **current CET1 buffers, LCR/NSFR, detailed securities losses, loan concentrations, charge-offs and reserve coverage** for each bank.

There are also source-quality issues:

- All five generic corporate-credit dossiers **withhold their aggregate credit-risk scores**. I have not treated their filing-activity scores as evidence of insolvency.
- Citi’s parent financial metrics are stale.
- Wells Fargo’s dossier contains a **duplicate LEI record**; I used the exact bank-entity identifiers in the agency references rather than relying on that automatic identity match.
- June financial statements, October market quotes and older standing rating references describe different time frames.

## Bottom line

**JPMorgan is the strongest relative reference point in the data reviewed. Bank of America and Wells Fargo have solid observed buffers but need earnings and loan-quality monitoring. Citi and Goldman warrant the most additional diligence—while their positive Fitch outlooks materially temper a bearish interpretation.**

The clearest shared risk is **weaker credit conditions feeding into earnings and capital**, with funding, valuation and operational risks requiring bank-specific detail. The available Watchtower evidence supports that monitoring framework, but not a precise default probability or a definitive one-to-five solvency ranking.